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The Problem of Socially Desirable Responding
Most studies in the field of personality research rely exclu-
sively on self-report measures (Vazire, 2006). For decades, 
one of the reasons why this approach to personality assess-
ment has been criticized is the suspicion that people who 
respond to questionnaires may tend to portray themselves in 
overly positive ways. More important, the extent to which 
people portray themselves in overly positive or negative 
ways may differ (John & Robins, 1994). Terms like “self-
enhancement/-derogation” or “socially (un-)desirable 
responding” are often used when referring to such interindi-
vidual differences. They denote the extent to which a person 
description implies a positive—or a negative—evaluation 
of a target person that is not justified by how the person 
“actually is,” but rather lies in the eye of the beholder. 
Socially (un-)desirable responding may be a problem in at 
least two ways: First, it may weaken the criterion validity of 
measures. For example, selection procedures may favor 
targets who present themselves better over targets who 
actually “are” better. Second, it may weaken the discrimi-
nant validity of measures by inducing correlations that only 
reflect the shared susceptibility of different measures to the 
same bias, rather than actual associations between the 
targets’ traits. For these reasons, it is important to make 
socially desirable responding itself measurable, and to 
determine how strongly it affects the self-report scales that 
are typically used in psychological research.
Aims of the Present Study
In this study, we present an approach for measuring socially 
desirable responding that is strongly inspired by an impor-
tant conceptual contribution by Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, 
and Robins (2004). Their work is presented below, along 
with a few important methodological modifications that we 
undertook in the present study. After introducing our 
method, we investigate the characteristics of the resulting 
measure of socially desirable responding in several 
important regards, using an empirical data set. In particular, 
we ask (a) whether the measure is reliable, (b) whether it 
actually measures bias as opposed to “actual behavior,” (c) 
whether it shows the properties of a moderator or 
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suppressor variable impairing validity, (d) to what extent 
self-reports of personality and life satisfaction are 
“contaminated” with this bias, (e) to what extent so-called 
“lie scales” or “social desirability scales” reflect the bias 
(which they are supposed to), and (f) to what extent associa-
tions between the bias and self-reports of personality are 
moderated by the evaluativeness of the items that are used 
for assessing the latter. All of these are crucial issues that 
have featured in the literature on socially desirable respond-
ing for decades. To foster the reader’s understanding of 
these issues, we will now present a brief overview of this 
literature, and of the major points of empirical and concep-
tual progress therein.
Overview of the Literature
McCrae and Costa (1983; cf. Wiggins, 1973) used the terms 
substance and style to distinguish the target’s actual charac-
teristics (= substance) from the positive or negative presen-
tation of those characteristics (= style). Indisputably, people 
differ in how socially desirable their actual behaviors are 
(Hofstee & Hendriks, 1998). In contrast, socially desirable 
responding (e.g., to a questionnaire) is a style issue: It con-
cerns the evaluative “spin” that is present in how the target’s 
personality is presented. Most person judgments probably 
incorporate both substance and style.
Early attempts at identifying persons who tend to overes-
timate their virtues and underestimate their weaknesses 
used so-called “lie scales” or “social desirability scales” 
(e.g., Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). In these scales, respon-
dents are presented with lists of personality features that are 
either desirable but rare, or undesirable but common. Self-
reports of persons who systematically endorse the first but 
deny the second kind of personality features in their self-
descriptions are identified as biased because such response 
patterns are considered “too good to be true.” Lie scales are 
supposed to capture style, but not substance. If this was 
what they did, then using a lie scale as a covariate should 
improve the correlation between self-ratings and criterion 
variables (e.g., other-ratings), because then the targets’ ten-
dencies to judge themselves too leniently or harshly would 
be controlled for. However, empirical studies could not con-
firm this prediction (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1992; McCrae 
& Costa, 1983; Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann, & Angleitner, 
2000). To the contrary, self–other agreement often dropped 
considerably when lie scales were used as covariates. One 
of the explanations that were offered for such findings was 
that lie scales may partly capture differences in how desir-
ably people actually behave (McCrae & Costa, 1983), so 
partialling them out would remove substance variance as 
well. In a recent review, McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, and 
Hough (2010) came to the conclusion that studies consis-
tently failed to show increases in self-report validity when 
lie scales were used as covariates, and thus the use of lie 
scales, despite being common, is still lacking empirical sup-
port. Other authors, however, challenged such conclusions, 
presenting evidence that some of the scales devised to 
assess response styles do react in predictable ways when 
participants are instructed to “fake good” or “fake bad” 
(e.g., Baity, Siefert, Chambers, & Blais, 2007; Morey & 
Lanier, 1998), that such effects may in fact be accompanied 
by decreases in predictor–criterion correlations (J. L. 
Anderson, Sellbom, Wygant, & Edens, 2013), and that in 
some instances the partialling out of lie scales does improve 
validity (e.g., Rohling et al., 2011). The dispute has not 
been ultimately resolved yet, and the debate continues (e.g., 
McGrath, Kim, & Hough, 2011; Morey, 2012). The issue is 
complicated by the fact that “faking” research addresses 
only intentional response distortions whereas socially desir-
able responding may come about both intentionally and 
unintentionally (Paulhus, 1984; Sackeim & Gur, 1979). In 
the present article, we will not attempt to resolve this issue, 
but rather will introduce and test a novel method of 
measuring self-enhancement bias (SEB) that goes beyond 
mere self-report.
Paulhus (2002) emphasized that accurately assessing 
the style component of a person judgment is only possible 
if a measure of the target’s “true” features (= substance) is 
available. The extent to which a perceiver deviates from 
that truth in his or her description of a target would then be 
interpretable as bias. If no such criterion variable is avail-
able, the relative extent to which a measure reflects sub-
stance versus style has to remain unclear. Paulhus and 
John (1998) used judgments by their targets’ acquain-
tances as measures of the targets’ actual personalities and 
interpreted the residuals from linear regressions of the 
targets’ self-ratings on these informant-ratings in terms of 
bias. In the present study, we use a similar approach (see 
below).
Important conceptual progress was also made with a 
paper by Kwan et al. (2004), who pointed out that overly 
positive (or negative) self-descriptions may reflect either of 
two comparisons: First, the targets’ self-ratings may be 
more (or less) positive or negative than the same targets’ 
judgments of the average other person (social comparison 
bias). Second, the targets’ self-judgments may be more (or 
less) positive than judgments of the same targets by the 
average other person (self-insight bias). Only considering 
one of these possibilities will always leave one possible 
confounder unaccounted for: People who judge themselves 
more positively than they judge others may actually “be 
better” than those others, thus it is necessary to also control 
for how others perceive them. On the other hand, people 
who judge themselves more positively than they are judged 
by others may simply expose a general favorability bias in 
judgments of all targets. Thus, in order to assess people’s 
evaluative attitudes toward themselves in particular, both 
types of comparison have to be considered.
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In their study, Kwan et al. (2004) let 128 student partici-
pants get acquainted with one another in small groups of 4 
or 5 persons, and then provide self- and other-ratings in a 
round robin format. Analyses showed that the different 
kinds of positivity bias (i.e., comparisons of self-ratings 
with ratings of others, by others, and of and by others) were 
sufficiently distinct from each other, and also differentially 
associated with measures of “adjustment” (e.g., self-
esteem). These findings confirm that separately analyzing 
different kinds of evaluative comparisons between self and 
others is in fact necessary. Kwan et al.’s (2004) model, 
which essentially represents an application of the social 
relations model (Kenny, 1994) to the issue of self-enhance-
ment, constitutes the conceptual backbone of the present 
article: Our measure of self-enhancement also reflects the 
positivity of a person’s self-judgment that remains after 
controlling for how positively the person judges others and 
is judged by others. However, we introduce a number of 
methodological refinements to Kwan et al.’s approach, 
which will be explained in the “Method” section.
Several researchers have argued that there must be a 
close correspondence between the social desirability of an 
item’s content (i.e., how positive endorsing the item makes 
the target appear), and the perceiver’s evaluative attitude 
toward the target (Bäckström, Björklund, & Larsson, 2009; 
John & Robins, 1993; Leising & Borkenau, 2011; McCrae 
& Costa, 1983; Saucier, 1994; Vazire, 2010). This corre-
spondence may be conceptualized as an interaction effect: 
If a perceiver does not have a particularly positive or nega-
tive attitude toward a target, then it should not matter much 
whether the item she or he uses has a positive or a negative 
evaluative connotation—the perceiver may or may not 
endorse items, irrespective of how “good” or “bad” doing 
so will make the target appear. Likewise, even if the per-
ceiver does have a strong evaluative attitude toward the tar-
get, that attitude should only translate into her or his ratings 
of the target if the respective item also has an evaluative 
connotation. If the item is evaluatively neutral, the responses 
of perceivers with different evaluative attitudes toward the 
same target should not differ much. Although theoretical 
deliberations such as these seem compelling, empirical 
research has only recently begun to directly investigate 
their validity (e.g., Bäckström et al., 2009; Leising, Gallrein, 
& Dufner, 2014). Therefore, we also test whether our new 
measure of SEB interacts with the evaluative tone of the 
items in predicting responses to self-report questionnaires.
Method
Sample
The target sample in this study comprised 100 women and 
101 men with a mean age M = 24.09 years (SD = 5.05). The 
average level of education in the sample was high, as 174 
(86.6%) participants had attained “Abitur” (the highest sec-
ondary education degree in Germany, which is attained by 
less than 50% of a birth cohort). Participants were recruited 
among the students of a midsized university in the East of 
Germany, and from the local community. They were paid 
30 Euro for their participation.
Procedure
Our measure of self-enhancement is based on the compari-
son of people’s self-judgments with how they judge others 
and how they are judged by others (Kwan et al., 2004). To 
enable these comparisons, participants judged their own 
behavior in a set of standardized laboratory situations. They 
also judged the behavior of four so-called “standard targets” 
in the same situations, and were judged by four so-called 
“standard perceivers.”
On arriving at the lab, the participants were greeted by 
the experimenter and asked to fill out a consent form. 
Afterward, they completed a set of self-report personality 
questionnaires and three brief intelligence tests (see below). 
Next, the experimenter presented them with the following 
series of 17 tasks: (1) reading a brief meteorological text 
(explaining the average temperature curve in the course of a 
day); (2) describing a book or a movie they enjoyed; (3) 
inventing as many different uses as possible for a cork; (4) 
inventing a brief story based on an image displayed on a 
TAT (thematic apperception test) card; (5) indicating the 
years in which World War II began and ended, and the year 
in which the Berlin wall was built; (6) explaining the mean-
ing of the word “symmetry”; (7) calculating the square of 
16 and the square root of 121; (8) reporting on some recent 
experience of being “successful”; (9) explaining what is 
important in life and what they would like to achieve; (10) 
recounting a recent experience of being angry or sad; (11) 
discussing a few things that they worry about; (12) 
recounting a recent experience of “simply having a good 
time”; (13) talking about something that they always wanted 
to try, but did not dare to try yet; (14) telling a joke of their 
own choice; (15) singing a song of their own choice; (16) 
taking part in an assertiveness role-play (i.e., calling a 
neighbor late in the evening, to complain about loud music 
coming from her house); and (17) pantomiming the word 
“party” (which in German only means “festivity,” not 
“political party”). Some of these tasks were inspired by, or 
directly adapted, from previous studies investigating simi-
lar issues (e.g., Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & 
Angleitner, 2004). The tasks were always presented in the 
same order. The participants’ behavior during the complete 
sequence of tasks was videotaped (i.e., 1 video-clip per par-
ticipant was recorded).
After completing all tasks, the participants were asked to 
judge five videotapes, using a list of adjectives (see below). 
Each videotape showed a person engaging in the 17 tasks 
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described above. One of these persons was the current par-
ticipant himself or herself (i.e., we showed each participant 
the videotape what we had just recorded with him or her), 
the other four persons were the four standard targets, which 
were the same for all participants. The participants were to 
judge the behavior of each of the five persons, using the 
adjectives. The five tapes were presented in random orders. 
The videotapes of all participants were also judged by the 
four standard perceivers, which were the same for all par-
ticipants. Thus, each participant was part of a group of 201 
perceivers who judged the same four standard targets, and 
also part of a group of 201 targets who were judged by the 
same four standard perceivers. The ratings were to reflect 
the respective target’s behavior across the 17 situations, that 
is, each perceiver judged each target only once, but on the 
complete set of adjectives.
This design enabled us to assess (a) how positively the 
participants judged others (i.e., the standard targets), (b) 
how positively the participants were judged by others (i.e., 
the standard perceivers), and (c) how positively the partici-
pants judged themselves. These are the three kinds of infor-
mation that are needed to compute the SEB according to 
Kwan et al. (2004). The overall positivity of a judgment 
was quantified in terms of the profile correlation between a 
perceiver’s ratings of a target on the adjective list and aver-
age ratings of those adjectives’ social desirability (see 
below). Note that no personal interaction of any kind took 
place between perceivers and targets in the present study—
this study was only concerned with issues of social judg-
ment, not social interaction.
The four standard targets had been assessed before we 
started recruiting the 201 participants. They were selected 
from a larger group of 20 pilot targets, all of whom 
engaged in the same set of tasks to which the 201 partici-
pants were later exposed. Two men and two women of 
about equal age (about 25) were selected as standard tar-
gets. We took care to pick standard targets that differed 
considerably in how they engaged with the tasks. In order 
to reduce the risk that the participants knew the standard 
targets, the latter were recruited from a town about 30 
kilometers away from the city where the main study was 
conducted. Prior acquaintance between perceivers and tar-
gets was to be avoided, in order to rule out effects of per-
ceiver loyalty (e.g., a “pal-serving bias” and range 
restriction; Leising, Erbs, & Fritz, 2010; Leising et al., 
2014; Peabody & Goldberg, 1989).
The four standard perceivers provided their ratings at 
the very end of the study, after the laboratory assess-
ments of the 201 participants had been completed. We 
selected two men and two women of about equal age 
(about 25) as standard perceivers. For their ratings of the 
participants’ behavior, they used the same list of adjec-
tives that the participants had used for rating themselves 
and the four standard targets.
Measures
Adjective List. We used a list of 46 adjectives (see the appen-
dix) for all judgments of behavior in the lab. The same list 
was used for the participants’ ratings of themselves, the par-
ticipants’ ratings of the standard targets, and the standard 
perceivers’ ratings of the participants. The behavior ratings 
were needed for computing the SEB (see below). In addi-
tion, the participants also completed a more traditional self-
report version of this measure before engaging with the 
tasks, that is, they provided general retrospective descrip-
tions of their own personalities by means of the adjectives. 
The adjective list comprised the 30 terms that Borkenau and 
Ostendorf (1998) had compiled as a brief measure of the 
Big Five personality factors (each factor is assessed by 
three positive and three negative items), and 16 adjectives 
selected from the interpersonal adjective list (Jacobs & 
Scholl, 2005), such that each of the eight “octants” of the 
interpersonal circumplex model (Wiggins, 1979) was 
assessed by two items.
Intelligence Tests. Three brief intelligence tests were used to 
assess the participants’ intellectual capacities. The results of 
these tests were needed as an accuracy criterion in the sup-
pressor and moderator analyses that we present below. The 
digit linking test (Zahlen–Verbindungs test; Oswald & 
Roth, 1987) is a test of cognitive processing speed that uses 
numerical material. In this test, participants use a pencil to 
draw connections between 90 circles containing the num-
bers 1 to 90. The circles are to be connected in ascending 
order. Performance is measured in terms of the time it takes 
a participant to complete this task. Due to limited resources, 
we only used two of the four standard sheets this test com-
prises. Studies have shown good retest reliability (r = .84; 
interval: 6 months) for the test score (Oswald & Roth, 1987) 
and a correlation of r = .71 with general intelligence 
(Vernon, 1993).
Subtest 3 of the performance test system (Leistungsprüfsystem; 
Horn, 1983) was used to assess Reasoning or Fluid Intelligence 
(Cattell, 1971; Thurstone, 1938). This test comprises 40 sets of 
8 geometrical figures. For each item, participants are to decide 
which of the figures does not conform to the logical pattern 
shared by the other seven figures (e.g., the first item consists of 
a circle and seven diamonds). The items become increasingly 
difficult. Performance is measured in terms of the number of 
correct responses. Studies have shown acceptable retest reli-
ability (r = .66; intervals varying) for this test, and a correlation 
of r = .83 with general intelligence (Horn, 1983).
Finally, we used the multiple choice vocabulary intelli-
gence test (Mehrfachwahl–Wortschatz test, MWT-B; Lehrl, 
2005) to assess crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1971). In 
this test, the participants are to identify real words among 
nonwords that only look like real words. Each item contains 
one real word and four distractors, and items become 
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increasingly difficult. Again, performance is measured in 
terms of the number of correct solutions. Studies have shown 
good retest reliability (r = .87, interval: 14 months) for this 
test, and a correlation of r = .81 with general intelligence 
(Lehrl, 2005).
We computed an overall intelligence score, by averaging 
the standardized scores of the three individual tests. Before 
doing this, completion times for the digit linking test were 
multiplied with −1, such that higher scores also reflected 
higher ability. The internal consistency of the total intelli-
gence score was α = .60, indicating that it covered a rela-
tively broad measurement domain.
Personality Questionnaires and Social Desirability Scales. Before 
engaging in the 17 lab tasks, the participants were asked to 
complete a number of well-established self-report question-
naires. We picked questionnaires that had a strong 
self-evaluative component to them, as we expected that 
their items would at least partly reflect socially desirable 
responding. In addition, we also presented the participants 
with two measures that are explicitly aimed at capturing 
socially desirable responding. All items were to be answered 
using a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 = does not fit at all to 
5 = fits perfectly. The only exception were the items of the 
modified Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), for which the 
response scale ranged from 1 = never to 5 = almost always. 
The internal consistencies of the scales are displayed in 
Table 1.
Adjective list. As noted above, the same items that the 
participants used for judging their own and others’ behavior 
in the lab also appeared as a traditional retrospective self-
report measure of personality. Only two items pertaining to 
intellectual capacity were used in subsequent analyses (see 
below).
Beck Depression Inventory. The BDI (Beck & Steer, 
1987) asks participants to report how much they were 
recently affected by some of the most prominent symp-
toms of depression. In the present study, we used a modi-
fied German version of the BDI (Schmitt & Maes, 2000) 
with only 20 items (excluding weight loss). In this ver-
sion, the response format is changed such that partici-
pants are asked to report the frequency of each symptom, 
rather than deciding which of four alternative sentences 
describes themselves best (as is the case in the original 
BDI).
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) consists of 10 items assessing the 
overall positive or negative views that people have of them-
selves. In the present study, the revised German version by 
Collani and Herzberg (2003; Ferring & Filipp, 1996) was 
used.
Life Orientation Test–Revised (LOT-R). The German trans-
lation of the original version (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 
1994) of this measure was devised by Glaesmer, Hoyer, 
Klotsche, and Herzberg (2008). The measure assesses dis-
positional optimism (i.e., expecting the best for one’s per-
sonal future), and comprises six items only (plus four filler 
items).
Narcissistic Personality Inventory. The Narcissistic Per-
sonality Inventory (NPI) was developed in reference to the 
DSM-III (APA, 1980) criteria for Narcissistic Personal-
ity Disorder. The original measure (Raskin & Hall, 1979; 
Raskin & Terry, 1988) comprises 40 forced-choice items: 
Each item contains two alternative sentences and partici-
pants are to decide which of the two describes themselves 
better. In the present study, we used the German translation 
Table 1. Intercorrelations of Self-Report Scales, Self-Evaluation Factors, and Measures of Judgment Positivity.
Positivity
Scale α Factor 1: PSR Factor 2: CTL Self-ratings Standard perceivers Standard targets Self-enh bias
Factor 1: PSR — 1.00 .28 .51 .28 −.03 .43
Factor 2: CTL — .28 1.00 .31 .13 −.14 .29
BDI .85 −.90 −.15 −.41 −.24 −.02 −.34
RSE .86 .84 .29 .43 .27 −.01 .36
LOT-R .76 .73 .38 .45 .37 −.03 .34
NPI .89 .37 .95 .33 .12 −.17 .32
BIDR-IM .63 .31 −.17 .26 .08 .09 .24
BIDR-SDE .63 .57 .33 .30 −.03 −.06 .34
BIDR-total .69 .54 .07 .35 .04 .03 .36
SES-17 .69 .43 .01 .25 .05 .03 .25
Note. PSR = Positive Self-Regard; CTL = Claim to Leadership; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (modified); RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; LOT-R 
= Life Orientation Test–Revised; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; BIDR = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; SDE = Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement; IM = Impression Management; SES-17 = Soziale Erwünschtheits-Skala (Social Desirability Scale). |r| > .14 are significant at p < .05.
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of the NPI by Schütz, Marcus, and Sellin (2004). To make 
the NPI better comparable to the other measures, we pre-
sented all 80 sentences as separate items.
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). The 
German translation of the original version (Paulhus, 1984, 
1991) of this measure was devised by Musch, Brockhaus, 
and Bröder (2002). Its 20 items are supposed to assess 
two kinds of socially desirable responding, “self-decep-
tive enhancement” (SDE; involuntary; actually having an 
overly positive view of oneself) and “impression manage-
ment” (IM; voluntary; presenting oneself in an overly posi-
tive fashion, but not really believing that image of oneself 
to be true). The measure is essentially based on the “too 
good to be true” logic discussed above. In the present study, 
the correlation between the two subscales was r(199) = .23, 
p = .001.
Social Desirability Scale (SES-17). This German measure 
was devised by Stoeber (1999) and is also supposed to 
assess socially desirable responding based on the traditional 
“too good to be true” logic. It comprises 17 items assessing 
rare virtues and common flaws.
Life Satisfaction Ratings. The last 115 participants that took 
part in the present study were asked to report how satis-
fied they were with 21 different aspects of their own lives. 
Specifically, they were asked to rate their level of satis-
faction with their own physical health, work conditions, 
intimate relationship (if they had one), education, outer 
appearance, income, overall financial situation, the Ger-
man legal system, the German political system, the cur-
rent German government, their friends, sexual life, living 
situation, body weight, style of dress, parents, siblings, 
children, the TV program in general, as well as their lei-
sure activities and future prospects. The participants used 
a scale ranging from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 5 (very 
satisfied) for these ratings. We included life 
satisfaction ratings because we were interested in the 
degree to which such ratings reflect SEB.
Item Desirability Ratings
A separate group of 30 participants (22 female; age: 
M = 22.03 years, SD = 3.7) judged all items of the personal-
ity questionnaires, the adjective list, and the social desir-
ability scales with regard to how much of a positive or 
negative evaluation is implied by using the respective 
description for a target person. These ratings were essential 
for computing the self-enhancement index, and for investi-
gating the interaction between perceiver attitude and eval-
uative item tone (see below). The response options for 
these ratings ranged from 1 (=very negative) to 5 (=very 
positive). Interrater reliability was ICC(2, 30) = .99.
Computation of the Self-Enhancement Bias
Based on Kwan et al.’s model, we conceptualized the SEB 
as the tendency to judge oneself more positively than one 
judges others, and more positively than one is judged by 
others. We operationalized judgment positivity in terms of 
profile correlations between a perceiver’s judgments of a 
target on the 46 adjectives and averaged ratings of these 
items’ social desirabilities (Edwards, 1953; Leising et al., 
2010; Locke & Horowitz, 1997). The main advantage of 
this approach is that it exactly quantifies the extent to which 
the perceiver’s ratings of the target may be predicted from 
how positive or negative they make the target appear: A 
profile correlation of 1 implies that the perceiver rated the 
target exactly as one would rate a “perfect person” (i.e., the 
more positive/negative the item, the more/less the item gets 
endorsed), a correlation of −1 implies the opposite, and a 
correlation of 0 implies that the perceiver rated the target 
irrespective of the items’ evaluative connotations. In their 
original study, Kwan et al. (2004) simply keyed all items in 
the desirable direction and then separately averaged per-
ceiver- and target-effects across items. This procedure is 
less exact than ours because it gives equal weight to all 
items, irrespective of how evaluative they are, and thereby 
introduces error variance (leading to lower power). Also, our 
approach makes the overall positivity of judgments quantifi-
able within a common metric (correlation coefficients), and 
thus directly comparable between studies.
The positivity of the participants’ self-judgments was 
compared with the average positivity of the judgments of 
the same participants by the four standard perceivers, and 
with the average positivity of the same participants’ judg-
ments of the four standard targets. Again we modified Kwan 
et al.’s approach somewhat, as we regressed the first vari-
able on the latter two variables, and interpreted the residu-
als as SEB, rather than computing simple difference scores 
(Paulhus & John, 1998). The main advantage of doing so is 
that the resulting measure of SEB will, by definition, be 
independent of the two predictors (i.e., the positivities of 
standard perceiver and standard target judgments), and may 
thus be independently interpreted. Another advantage is that 
the approach of using regression residuals is more in keeping 
with the types of analyses (correlation, regression) that are 
typically used in this research field, and in the present article.
First we computed the above-described positivity corre-
lations (i.e., profile correlations between item endorsements 
and item desirabilities across the 46 adjectives) for each 
description of a target by a perceiver. The positivity of a 
given participant’s average judgment of the four standard 
targets may be interpreted as that perceiver’s evaluative 
“perceiver-effect,” that is, the perceiver’s tendency to judge 
other people positively (cf. Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 
2010; Wood, Harms, & Vazire, 2010). The positivity of 
the four standard perceivers’ average judgment of a given 
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participant may be interpreted as that participant’s evalua-
tive “target-effect,” that is, his or her tendency to be judged 
positively by other people. We computed a total of 201 pro-
file correlations between item desirabilities and self-ratings, 
201 profile correlations between item desirabilities and 
average ratings of others (i.e., standard targets), and 201 
profile correlations between item desirabilities and average 
ratings by others (i.e., standard perceivers). Then we sub-
jected these correlations to Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation 
and used them in a multiple regression analysis. Specifically, 
we simultaneously predicted the positivities of the partici-
pants’ self-judgments from the positivities of their average 
judgments of and by others. The residuals resulting from 
this regression constitute our measure of SEB (i.e., the ten-
dency to judge oneself more positively than would be 
expected based on (a) how positively one judges others and 
(b) how positively one is judged by others).
Results
Basic Statistics Regarding the Positivity Indices
Table 2 displays the Spearman-Brown–corrected split-half 
reliabilities (using random splits of the 46 adjectives), the 
means and standard deviations, and the intercorrelations of 
the various positivity indices. All indices were highly reli-
able, and several associations between them were notewor-
thy: First, as in Kwan et al. (2004), evaluative perceiver- and 
target-effects were not significantly associated with one 
another (r = −.13). That is, judging others more positively 
was unrelated to being judged more positively by others. 
Second, the positivity of the participants’ self-judgments 
was moderately related to the positivity of the standard per-
ceiver judgments (r = .39). Thus, participants whose behav-
ior was judged more positively by the standard perceivers 
also tended to judge their own behavior more positively. 
Third, however, the positivity of the participants’ self-judg-
ments was unrelated to the positivity of their judgments of 
the standard targets (r = .03). This implies that, in the pres-
ent study, evaluative perceiver-effects (tendencies to judge 
other people more or less positively) could essentially have 
been ignored in computing the SEB. Fourth, the SEB was 
perfectly (and inevitably) independent of the positivity of 
the standard perceiver and standard target ratings, whereas 
at the same time being highly correlated with the positivity 
of the participants’ self-ratings. This is the ideal correlation 
pattern one would hope for in a proper index of SEB 
(see above). All four indices were normally distributed 
(K-S-tests: Z < 0.71, p > .700).
The average positivity was .66 (SD = .32) for the partici-
pants’ self-judgments, but only .46 (SD = .51) for the judg-
ments of the participants by the standard perceivers, and .60 
(SD = .37) for the judgments of the standard targets by the 
participants. A repeated-measures analysis of variance, 
F(2, 199) = 17.03, p < .001, revealed that the participants 
did judge themselves significantly more positively, on aver-
age, than they were judged by the four standard perceivers 
(Cohen’s d = 0.55; p < .001), but not significantly more 
positively than they judged the four standard targets 
(Cohen’s d = 0.25; p = .094). Thus, in Kwan et al.’s (2004) 
terminology, the average participant did display a self-
insight bias, but not a social comparison bias.
Predicting Self-Rated Intelligence From Actual 
Intelligence and Self-Enhancement Bias
Responses to items of self-report questionnaires may be 
assumed to reflect “the truth” regarding the targets to some 
extent, as well as the perceivers’ tendencies to self-enhance 
or self-denigrate (McCrae & Costa, 1983). We investigated 
the relative contributions of truth and bias to self-ratings, 
using the measurement domain of intelligence. The intelli-
gence domain was chosen for two reasons: First, there is 
good agreement that people’s “actual” intelligence is mea-
surable by means of standardized tests, so our choice of 
intelligence tests as an accuracy criterion should be widely 
acceptable. Second, intelligence is a highly valued person-
ality trait. In fact, Leising, Ostrovski, and Borkenau (2012) 
found that among the 758 terms their German research par-
ticipants came up with when asked to describe themselves 
and others, “intelligent” was the most positively evaluated 
of all terms. Likewise, in N. Anderson’s (1968) study, 
“intelligent” was the seventh most positively evaluated of 
Table 2. Basic Statistics Regarding Positivity Indices.
Correlations
Type of judgment Reliability Mean (SD) 2 3 4
Self (1) .80 .66 (.32) .39** .03 .92**
Standard perceivers (2) .92 .46 (.51) −.13 .00
Standard targets (3) .84 .60 (.37) .00
Self-enhancement bias (4) .77 .00 (.29)  
Note. N = 201. Reliability = split-half–corrected correlation between positivity indices based on two random halves of the item sample; self-
enhancement bias = residuals from regressing self-ratings on averaged standard perceiver ratings and averaged standard target ratings.
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Figure 1. Predicting the (r-to-Z transformed) associations 
between personality item endorsement and self-enhancement 
bias (SEB) from rated item desirability, r(155) = .64, p < .001.
555 English terms. Therefore, self-ratings of intelligence 
should be strongly susceptible to being affected by people’s 
self-enhancement or self-derogation biases.
Our set of personality questionnaires contained the same 
item list that was also used for rating the participants’ 
behavior in the lab. Among these items were the terms ken-
ntnisreich (knowledgeable), and klug (smart, fourth most 
positive in Leising et al., 2012). We used the average 
(α = .79) of these two items as the outcome variable in a 
multiple regression analysis, and tried to predict it from the 
participants’ actual intelligence, as measured by the average 
of the three intelligence tests, and from the SEB. In this anal-
ysis, the SEB was computed omitting the two intelligence 
items, so predictor and criterion were not contaminated with 
one another. The resulting model, F(2, 198) = 15.98, R2 = .14, 
p < .001, showed that actual intelligence (standardized 
beta = 0.27, t = 4.09, p < .001) and the SEB (standardized 
beta = 0.27, t = 4.11, p < .001) made significant contribu-
tions of the same size in predicting self-rated intelligence. 
Repeating this analysis for the two intelligence items sepa-
rately yielded virtually identical results. So, as expected, self-
ratings of intelligence did reflect both SEB and the truth.
If self-ratings of intelligence are substantially affected by 
SEB, then SEB might operate as a suppressor variable, and 
controlling for SEB should lead to stronger associations 
between self-rated and actual intelligence. However, the stan-
dardized betas just reported (and the identical semipartial cor-
relations) were only marginally larger than the respective 
zero-order correlations between predictors (intelligence, 0.26; 
SEB, 0.26) and criterion (self-assessed intelligence). Thus, 
even though the participants’ tendency to self-enhance or self-
denigrate clearly affected their ratings of their own intelli-
gence, it did not act as a suppressor, because using the SEB as 
a covariate did not lead to any substantial increase in validity. 
This finding is well in line with most of the literature (e.g., 
Paunonen & LeBel, 2012), and will be discussed further below. 
We also used moderated regression analysis to test for possible 
moderation effects of SEB on the association between self-
rated and actual intelligence. Specifically, we entered the prod-
uct of actual intelligence and SEB as an additional predictor 
into the regression. Doing so enabled us to test whether the 
association between actual and self-rated intelligence was 
stronger for participants low in SEB (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 
1992). However, the standardized beta for the product was not 
significant (−.05, p = .455), whereas the standardized betas for 
actual intelligence and SEB did not change. Thus, SEB did not 
function as a moderator either.
Is the Effect of Self-Enhancement Bias on Self-
Ratings Moderated by Item Desirability?
For the analysis just presented, we chose a highly evalua-
tive trait (intelligence) as the criterion variable, because 
that made it likely that self-ratings would be affected by 
individual differences in SEB, besides actual intelligence. 
As a next step, we tested the assumption that item desirabil-
ity moderates the effect of SEB on self-ratings more sys-
tematically: First, we separately correlated the participants’ 
SEBs with their responses to each of the 157 items of the 
personality questionnaires (RSE, NPI, LOT-R, BDI, BIDR, 
SES-17). This resulted in 157 correlation coefficients 
reflecting the extent to which the participants’ responses to 
each item could be predicted from their individual SEBs. 
Second, these correlation coefficients were r-to-Z trans-
formed and then correlated with the average ratings of the 
items’ social desirability. The stronger this correlation, the 
better the items’ proneness to reflecting self-enhancement 
or –denigration may be predicted from how much the item 
has desirable or undesirable content.
The results were very clear: The extent to which the par-
ticipants’ responses to the individual questionnaire items 
could be predicted from SEB ranged from r = −.32 to 
r = .31, and (after r-to-Z transformation) correlated at 
r(155) = .64, p < .001 with the rated desirabilities of the 
items. Accounting for nonindependency by means of a mul-
tilevel model led to the exact same conclusion. An inspec-
tion of the scatter plot (see Figure 1) revealed that this effect 
was nicely linear and symmetric: Items with undesirable 
content showed negative associations with SEB (i.e., self-
enhancers rated themselves lower on these items), and 
items with desirable content showed positive associations 
(i.e., self-enhancers rated themselves higher on these 
items). For example, participants with stronger self-
enhancement tendencies tended to agree less with the 
Rosenberg item “I certainly feel useless at times” (average 
desirability rating: 1.59), r = −.25, whereas they tended to 
agree more with the Rosenberg item “I take a positive atti-
tude towards myself” (average desirability rating: 4.50), 
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r = .25. Evaluatively neutral items, on the other hand, did 
not reflect the participants’ tendencies to self-enhance or 
–denigrate to the same extent. For example, responses to 
the BIDR item “I sometimes drive faster than the speed 
limit” (average desirability rating: 3.00) correlated at only 
r = −.04 with the participants’ SEBs.
Thus, item desirability clearly did moderate the influ-
ence of SEB on self-ratings of personality (cf. Bäckström 
et al., 2009; John & Robins, 1993; Leising & Borkenau, 
2011; McCrae & Costa, 1983; Vazire, 2010). Note that the 
highest correlation (.31) was only slightly higher than the 
one we found when predicting self-ratings of intelligence 
(see above). This means that the effect of self-enhancement 
on self-ratings of intelligence was close to the upper limit of 
what may be expected, which accords well with the fact that 
intelligence is one of the most positively valued traits.
Associations Between Judgment Positivity Indices 
and Questionnaire Self-Ratings
As a next step, we investigated the extent to which the par-
ticipants’ self-ratings on the various questionnaire scales 
were associated with the three different indices of judg-
ment positivity. We performed these analyses not only at 
the level of the individual self-report scales but also at the 
level of broader factors, to minimize redundancy among 
the different constructs as much as possible. When the 157 
items were subjected to a joint principal components anal-
ysis, the Scree plot (eigenvalues: 17.04, 9.38, 5.82, 4.98, 
4.63) clearly suggested the presence of two predominant 
factors, corroborating the outcome of a previous study in 
which a similar set of measures was factored (Leising, 
Ostrovski, & Zimmermann, 2013). A couple of weaker, 
more content-specific factors could also be identified, but 
we chose to ignore them as they did not make additional 
contributions to the association between self-ratings and 
positivity indices.
After Promax rotation, the highest loading items on the 
first factor (according to the pattern matrix) were “On the 
whole, I am satisfied with myself” (.72; RSE), “I certainly 
feel useless at times” (−.70; RSE), “I accuse myself for my 
mistakes and weaknesses” (−.67; BDI), “All in all, I am 
inclined to feel that I am a failure” (−.67; RSE), and “I take 
a positive attitude towards myself” (.66; RSE). The highest 
loading items on the second factor were “I see myself as a 
good leader” (.67; NPI), “I would prefer to be a leader” (.67, 
NPI), “I have a natural talent for influencing people” (.65, 
NPI), “I have a strong will to power” (.63; NPI), and “I 
really like to be the center of attention” (.63; NPI).
This factor structure closely resembled the one previ-
ously reported by Leising et al. (2013), who factored a simi-
lar set of measures. Thus, the interpretation of the two 
factors was relatively straightforward: The first factor 
reflects people’s overall contentedness with themselves. In 
the Leising et al. (2013) study, this factor was called 
“Positive Self-Regard” (PSR), a nomenclature that we will 
adopt in the present article. However, we believe that this 
factor is basically identical with the broad general self-eval-
uation factor that has been identified by several authors, and 
given various names such as “Demoralization” (Tellegen, 
1985; inversely keyed), “Personal Negativity” (Furr & 
Funder, 1998; inversely keyed), “Core Self-Evaluation” 
(Bono & Judge, 2003), and “Vulnerability” (Pincus et al., 
2009, inversely keyed). The second factor reflects people’s 
subjective capacity and motivation to lead others. It is 
essentially identical with the main factor of the NPI 
(Ackerman et al., 2011; Kubarych, Deary, & Austin, 2004). 
However, Leising et al. (2013) chose to call this factor 
“Claim to Leadership” (CTL) in order to avoid the wide-
spread conceptual confusion around the term narcissism 
(Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 2008; Miller & Campbell, 2008). 
The second factor is also highly akin to the “Grandiosity” 
factor from the “Pathological Narcissism Inventory” 
(Pincus et al., 2009; Wright, Lukowitsky, Pincus, & Conroy, 
2010). Overall, the outcome of this analysis suggests that 
the overlap among the constructs that are assessed by the 
questionnaires we used in our study is considerable, and 
largely explainable in terms of two common factors. Their 
factor scores were significantly, but only moderately corre-
lated with one another, r(199) = .28, p < .001. Complete 
factor loading matrices, as well as the raw data, are avail-
able from the first author, on request.
Table 1 displays the correlations between the individual 
self-report scales and the two broad factors, as well as the 
correlations of the scales and factors with the different indi-
ces of judgment positivity. As N is 201, correlations whose 
absolute value exceeds .14 are significant at p < .05. The 
individual scales reflected various mixtures of the two fac-
tors: The PSR factor was most clearly marked by high self-
esteem (RSE), r = .84; low depression (BDI), r = −.90; and 
high optimism (LOT-R), r = .73. The correlations between 
these three scales and the Claim to Leadership factor on the 
other hand were rather moderate, r < .40. Claim to Leadership 
was most clearly marked by the NPI, r = .95, which in turn 
showed a rather moderate correlation, r = .37, with PSR.
All scales and factors showed significant associations 
with a tendency to portray one’s own behavior in the lab 
positively (fourth data column), with coefficients ranging 
from r = .25 (SES-17) to r = .51 (PSR). Likewise, all scales 
and factors showed significant associations with the SEB 
(seventh data column), with coefficients ranging from 
r = .24 (BIDR-IM) to r = .43 (PSR). Notably, none of the 
so-called Social Desirability scales (BIDR-IM, BIDR-
SDE, SES-17) outperformed the Rosenberg Scale, the 
BDI, the Life Orientation Test, or the NPI in assessing self-
enhancement. Thus, these latter scales were just as valid 
measures of self-enhancement as were scales designed 
especially for that purpose.
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When the two factors (PSR, CTL) were simultane-
ously entered as predictors of SEB in a multiple regres-
sion analysis, corrected R2 = .21, F(1, 198) = 27.65, 
p < .001, both PSR (standardized beta = .38, p < .001) and 
CTL (standardized beta = .18, p = .007) independently 
predicted the SEB. This finding also replicates a previous 
one (Leising et al., 2013). It is important because it sug-
gests that self-enhancement is associated with two differ-
ent forms of self-evaluation, and that these effects are 
largely additive: The persons who will show the largest 
SEB are the ones who (a) have a positive attitude toward 
themselves (high PSR) and (b) consider themselves good 
leaders (high CTL).
We found a relatively differentiated pattern in regard to 
how the individual scales were associated with the positiv-
ity of judgments by the standard perceivers and judgments 
of the standard targets. Participants with higher self-esteem 
(r = .27), greater optimism (r = .37), and lower depression 
(r = −.24) were judged more positively by the standard per-
ceivers (fifth data column). Obviously, participants who 
were happier with themselves overall made better impres-
sions on the standard perceivers. In contrast, none of the 
social desirability scales predicted more positive evalua-
tions by the standard perceivers.
The NPI was the only scale that significantly predicted 
more negative judgments of the standard targets by the par-
ticipants (r = −.17). Thus, more “narcissistic” individuals 
actually had a tendency to denigrate others a bit, which is 
well in line with a more interpersonal interpretation of this 
scale (Leising et al., 2013). Taken together, it can be said 
that associations between personality self-ratings and eval-
uative target-effects (i.e., the positivity of averaged stan-
dard perceiver ratings) were generally stronger than 
associations between personality self-ratings and evaluative 
perceiver-effects (i.e., the positivity of averaged standard 
target ratings).
Associations Between Self-Enhancement Bias 
and Life Satisfaction Ratings
We were also interested in determining the extent to which 
the participants’ ratings of their own life satisfaction across 
various domains were associated with the SEB. To investi-
gate this, we first factored the participants’ judgments of 
their satisfaction with 21 different aspects of their own 
lives. Judgments of satisfaction with one’s children were 
omitted, because only 17 participants reported having chil-
dren. The first factor (eigenvalue = 4.33) was much stronger 
than any subsequent factors (2.10, 1.86, 1.61, . . .), so for the 
sake of simplicity we dismissed the latter. There was a 
significant association between the general life satisfaction 
factor and the SEB, r(113) = .38, p < .001. However, a 
relatively differentiated picture emerged with regard to 
associations between specific domains of life satisfaction 
and the SEB: Seven domains of life satisfaction had signifi-
cant (p < .05) associations with the SEB—work, 
r(75) = .44; appearance, r(113) = .34; financial situation, 
r(113) = .23; sex life, r(113) = .24; clothing style, 
r(113) = .23; parents, r(112) = .28; future prospects, 
r(113) = .22; all ps < .02—whereas the remaining 13 did 
not.
Discussion
We presented an empirical investigation based on Kwan et 
al.’s (2004) conceptualization of self-enhancement as a ten-
dency to judge oneself more positively than one is judged 
by others and more positively than one judges others. 
However, our study incorporated two important deviations 
from the original proposal by Kwan et al. (2004). First, we 
applied the model to the overall positivity of rating profiles, 
as measured by the profile correlation between item 
endorsements and item desirabilities. The advantages of 
doing so are that (a) items are directly weighted in accor-
dance with how evaluative they are (reducing error 
variance) and (b) the amount of social desirability involved 
in judgments becomes directly quantifiable, and thus com-
parable between studies. Second, rather than using differ-
ence scores between self-ratings and ratings of and by 
others, we regressed the positivity of the self-ratings on the 
positivity of the other ratings, and interpreted the residuals 
as the SEB (Paulhus & John, 1998). The advantage of doing 
so is that the SEB becomes independent of the two predic-
tors, and may thus be independently interpreted. We used this 
modified version of the Kwan et al. (2004) approach to 
answer a set of important research questions in regard to 
socially desirable responding (see page 2f. for the complete 
list of questions).
We demonstrated that all indices of judgment positivity 
had good reliability, as random samples of items produced 
positivity estimates that correlated highly with one another. 
The positivity of the targets’ self-judgments did correlate 
with the positivity of the standard perceiver judgments, but, 
unexpectedly, did not correlate with the positivity of the 
participants’ judgments of the standard targets. Thus, 
participants who judged others more positively did not 
judge themselves more positively as well. This could be 
interpreted as evidence that evaluative perceiver-effects 
may essentially be ignored in computing self-enhancement. 
However, given that the number of studies investigating 
these issues with advanced methodology is still very small, 
we prefer to abstain from making such a broad claim. More 
research is clearly needed to clarify whether the overall 
positivity of people’s self-images is (un-)related to how 
positively they view others.
The analysis in which we predicted self-ratings of intel-
ligence from the participants’ intelligence test scores and 
the SEB showed that the latter variable fully conformed to 
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expectations: It predicted self-ratings of a highly desirable 
trait (intelligence) independent of actual trait level. This is 
what one would hope for in a proper measure of self-
enhancement. At the same time, however, controlling for 
the SEB (as a possible suppressor or moderator) did not 
lead to any notable improvement in the validity of intelli-
gence self-ratings, a finding that is well in line with most of 
the published literature (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1992; 
McCrae & Costa, 1983; Piedmont et al., 2000). Paunonen 
and LeBel (2012) recently used a simulation approach to 
demonstrate that such seemingly contradictory findings 
(contamination of self-ratings with SEB; but failure to 
improve the validity of self-ratings by controlling for SEB) 
may be viewed as the default outcome for this kind of 
studies. One reason is that, in order be able to improve the 
validity of self-ratings by controlling for SEB, the contami-
nation of the self-ratings with SEB would have to be 
extremely strong. In our study the contamination rarely 
exceeded an absolute value of r = .30, even for the most 
evaluative traits, so substantial validity gains by controlling 
for SEB were unlikely. It seems possible, however, that 
under circumstances where incentives for self-enhancement 
are stronger (e.g., personnel selection), contamination—
and thus the potential for validity gains—would increase. 
Future research should address this possibility.
The extent to which the SEB predicted personality self-
ratings could very well be predicted from the rated social 
desirability of the respective items. This finding confirms 
the assumption that the perceiver’s evaluative attitude 
toward the target (operationalized as SEB in the present 
study) and the item’s evaluative tone closely interact in 
shaping personality ratings (Bäckström et al., 2009; 
Leising & Borkenau, 2011; Leising et al., 2010; Leising et 
al., 2014; McCrae & Costa, 1983; Saucier, 1994). The pre-
dictive power of the SEB in these analyses ranged from 
about r = −.30 to r = .30. It should be noted, however, that 
these were the associations we found for single items. 
When using a higher level of aggregation, individual dif-
ferences in self-enhancement may be expected to affect 
participants’ responses even more strongly (e.g., the broad 
PSR factor correlated at r = .43 with the SEB).
The shared variance of the 157 questionnaire items could 
largely be explained in terms of two factors. The first of 
these (PSR) had strong positive correlations with the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the Life Orientation Test–
Revised (i.e., dispositional optimism), as well as a strong 
negative correlation with the BDI. The second factor (Claim 
to Leadership) closely overlapped with the measurement 
domain of the total score of the NPI. The present research 
replicated previous studies showing that both factors predict 
self-enhancement (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; 
Gabriel, Crittelli, & Ee, 1994; John & Robins, 1994). 
However, the present study is only the second to demonstrate 
that the two factors independently predict self-enhancement 
(cf. Leising et al., 2013). So the people who will self-enhance 
the most arethose who consider themselves born leaders (high 
CTL) and are generally happy with themselves (high PSR). 
In contrast, people who shy away from leadership positions 
(low CTL) and are unhappy with themselves (low PSR) 
will tend to underestimate themselves considerably, 
whereas people who have high scores on one factor but low 
scores on the other factor will have more realistic self-
images (because then the effects of CTL and PSR should 
cancel out).
Notably, none of the so-called social desirability scales 
outperformed any of the other scales in predicting the 
SEB. Thus, the NPI, the LOT-R, the BDI, and the RSE are 
just as potent—or even more potent—indicators of socially 
desirable responding as are the BIDR and the SES-17. 
They all reflect self-enhancement at about r = .30 
(cf. Table 1). However, the social desirability scales were 
not systematically associated with the positivity of the 
standard perceiver judgments, whereas the RSE, the BDI, 
and the LOT-R were. An optimistic reading of these results 
would suggest that the social desirability scales actually 
do differ from the other scales in one important respect: 
Whereas all scales assess socially desirable responding to 
a similar extent, the social desirability scales do not also 
predict actual behavior (at least not in our lab tasks). Thus, 
the results of the present study may be interpreted as sug-
gesting that the social desirability scales we used assess 
only style, but not substance. This conclusion, however, 
hinges on the assumption that our participants’ behavior in 
the lab was sufficiently representative of their behavior in 
the outside world. Future research will thus have to address 
the question of whether social desirability scales differ 
from other scales in regard to their ability to predict real 
life behavior.
Our analyses focusing on life satisfaction showed that 
there is a strong general factor accounting for self-rated life 
satisfaction across various domains, and that this factor is 
associated with the SEB, r = .38. The cross-sectional design 
of the present study does not permit any analyses of the 
direction of effects, however. Thus, there are at least two 
plausible interpretations of these associations: Either, peo-
ple holding overly positive views of themselves (high SEB) 
may also tend to see various aspects of their own lives too 
positively. According to this interpretation, a person’s sub-
jective life satisfaction might at least partly reflect a judg-
ment bias: Given the exact same life circumstances, 
different persons might report quite different levels of life 
satisfaction, depending on their individual SEB levels. 
However, it would also be possible that people who have 
good reasons for being satisfied with their own lives (e.g., 
they actually have better workplaces or sex lives), develop 
a positively biased self-image (high SEB) as a result. 
According to this interpretation, the life satisfaction ratings 
would at least partly reflect a reality, and a more positive 
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reality might make people see themselves (e.g., their own 
behavior in the lab) more positively. The present study does 
not enable a decision as to which of these two explanations 
is more valid.
In interpreting the findings of the present study, we 
also need to consider the possibility that the participants’ 
ratings of their own behavior in the lab may reflect other 
influences apart from (a) their actual behavior and (b) 
their tendencies to view themselves more positively or neg-
atively. In fact, studies have shown that peoples’ ratings of 
their own behavior do reflect their general self-images (e.g., 
as “quick” or “lazy” in particular) to some extent, even if 
their “actual” behavior in the situation (as judged by observ-
ers at zero acquaintance) is controlled for (Leising, 2011; 
Leising et al., 2014; Sadler & Woody, 2003). Such content-
specific “consistency biases” may also have affected the par-
ticipants’ self-ratings in the present study. However, as we 
used a broad set of adjectives covering many different con-
tent domains, and profile correlations that quantify the over-
all positivity of personality profiles across items, it may be 
assumed that such biases merely constituted unsystematic 
measurement error in the end.
Summary and Conclusion
The present article established a new measure of socially desir-
able responding based on the reasoning of Kwan et al. (2004). 
We introduced two major refinements of their approach, to 
make the measure even better interpretable. Using this new 
measure, we showed that participants’ responses to self-report 
questionnaires do reflect SEB, and that they do so the more the 
respective items have evaluative (i.e., positive or negative) 
content. Notably, scales designed particularly for the purpose 
of assessing socially desirable responding (SES-17, BIDR) did 
not reflect SEB more than did the other scales (RSE, BDI, 
etc.). Also, no suppressor or moderator effects of socially 
desirable responding on the validity of self-ratings of intelli-
gence were found. Taken together, the study demonstrates that 
socially desirable responding is measurable and does affect 
self-reports of personality substantially. At the same time, it 
demonstrates that so-called “lie” or “social desirability” scales 




The Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) List. Temperamentvoll 
(Vivacious), Launisch (Erratic), Rücksichtsvoll (Consider-
ate), Gefühlsstabil (Emotionally Stable), Kenntnisreich 
(Knowledgeable), Scheu (Shy), Egoistisch (Egoistical), Kon-
taktfreudig (Sociable), Konsequent (Consistent), Klug 
(Smart), Schweigsam (Taciturn), Einfallslos (Unimaginative), 
Gutmütig (Good-Natured), Unbeständig (Unsteady), Verletz-
bar (Vulnerable), Dynamisch (Dynamic), Unkundig (Unin-
formed), Rechthaberisch (Dogmatic), Fleißig (Industrious), 
Empfindlich (Touchy), Verantwortungsbewusst (Responsi-
ble), Arbeitsscheu (Work-Shy), Leichtsinnig (Reckless), Hil-
fsbereit (Ready to Help), Geistreich (Witty), Gelassen 
(Relaxed), Unempfindlich (Robust), Phantasielos (Fanciless), 
Herrschsüchtig (Dictatorial), Zurückhaltend (Reserved).
From the Interpersonal Adjective List (Jacobs & Scholl, 2005).
Durchsetzungsfähig (Assertive), Zynisch (Cynical), 
Gehorsam (Obedient), Provokativ (Provocative), 
Aufgeschlossen (Open-Minded), Boshaft (Malicious), 
Ungesellig (Unsociable), Schüchtern (Bashful), Feindselig 
(Hostile), Selbstsicher (Self-assured), Einfühlsam 
(Empathetic), Verschlossen (Tight-Lipped), Herzlich 
(Cordial), Still (Silent), Folgsam (Compliant), 
Kommunikativ (Communicative).
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